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The Supreme Court recently upheld the free exercise rights of a religious group to
canvas door to door without first obtaining a permit.2 The group asserting that their right

to practice their faith through door to door contacts overrode the government’s interest in
restricting such activities even through ‘neutral’ laws was the Jehovah’s Witnesses.3 It

was altogether fitting that the Court in finding the Witnesses’ activities were the exercise
of their religion cited the free exercise decisions from the late 1930’s and early 1940’s.4

For it was Jehovah’s Witnesses who brought most of those cases before the Supreme
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Court,5 and in doing so, used their beliefs to establish much of the First Amendment free

exercise law we still use today. It is doubly fitting because the Justices on the Supreme

Court during that period used the Witnesses’ cases to establish their own constitutional

“faiths” about how much protection the Court should give these practices from the effects

of “neutral” laws. At the time these cases were coming before the Court the Court was
undergoing one of the greatest changeovers in its history.6 The justices appointed by

President Roosevelt remade First Amendment law. In so doing, these Justices pursued
development of their own constitutional faith into the law of the land.7 This article tracks

this remarkable confluence of forces that together created the First Amendment’s free
exercise jurisprudence.8

Arguments about where the balance should be struck between government

regulation and individuals’ freedom to practice their religion are as old as the Republic
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itself.9

But during the 1930’s and 1940’s, while the world waged a war pitting

democratic governments against totalitarian regimes in Europe and the South Pacific the

Jehovah’s Witnesses fought a war on the home front to establish the primacy of their

right to freely practice their faith against government interference or obstacles.

Bookmarks bracketing the beginning and end of their struggle were two Supreme Court
decisions involving the salute to the flag and the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.10
The road from Gobitis11 to Barnette12 is a remarkable story of the confluence of history,

theology and law. Franklin Roosevelt transformed the Supreme Court during his four
terms as President. He made nine appointments to the Court between 1937 and 1943.13

The average age of the Justices dropped from seventy-two for the “Nine Old Men” in
1937 to fifty-six in 1943.14 The judicial philosophies of the Court changed as well as the

change in personnel. The solicitude for individual rights increased as did the Justices’
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beliefs about the Court’s role in protecting those rights.15 During the same time the

Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs had evolved in a way that made aggressive preaching of the
“good news” central to the practice of their faith.16

During the Court’s transition period the Jehovah’s Witnesses brought their
arguments before the Supreme Court eight times.17 Eight times they lost. But on May 3,

1943 the tide turned. On that single day the Supreme Court decided thirteen cases
involving Jehovah’s Witnesses; they won twelve.18 The Court found the request for

injunctive relief in the thirteenth case moot, based on their striking down the statute
involved, in one of the other cases that day.19 One month later, on Flag Day – June 14th,
1943 – the Supreme Court decided in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette20

that Jehovah’s Witness’ schoolchildren could not be compelled to salute the American

flag in the public school classrooms. This stunning reversal of the Court’s own recent

15
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precedent21 has been called “one of the most notable acts in the entire span…of Supreme
Court history.”22

The story of Jehovah’s Witnesses battle for the First Amendment must begin

with a look at the unique characteristics of their faith.

These tenets led them to

proselytize their faith in the streets and door to door in small towns across America. It

also contributed to their decision to use the courts to vindicate their right to do so.

Jehovah’s Witnesses in the 1930’s and 1940’s were, and still are, a small but

zealous sect. They are milennialists; they believe the world is coming to an end soon,
when God will triumph over Satan and begin a thousand year reign.23 The group was
founded in the late 19th century in Pennsylvania by Charles Taze Russell. He taught his

followers to warn mankind of the impending Armageddon and to spread the “Truth” to

all who would listen. Russell thought the end would come in 1914 and he and his
followers would share in the Kingdom then.24 But the Apocalypse did not take place, and

Russell died suddenly three years later. The man who eventually assumed control of the
21
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group was Joseph Rutherford, who had been Russell’s lawyer.25

Rutherford imposed

tight controls. He developed a central organization of the group. Rutherford explained
Russell’s “error” in predicting the date of Armageddon as a ”test” from God.26

Russell had taught that a small group of the anointed would rule with God in

Heaven. As time passed and the number of these people, including Russell, died the rest

of his followers did not have much reason to expand their numbers beyond these chosen
few.27

Rutherford modified this doctrine. Christ, Rutherford taught, had begun the

millennial rule in 1914 as Russell had predicted. But the reign began in Heaven. Christ

had kicked Satan out of the Kingdom and restricted him to Earth. Now, at the appointed

time the “anointed ones” on Earth would rise up and rule with God in Heaven. But the

“multitude” still on Earth – most of the rank and file believers – could look forward to
immortality on Earth after Armageddon.28 This new doctrine provided something all

believers could benefit from.

Rutherford urged all his followers to spread this good

25
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news.29 Rutherford further organized and directed his flock. No longer known as
“Russellites” they became Jehovah’s Witnesses on earth.30 They were organized much

like an army, on a great crusade. Local congregations were “companies”; their directors
were “company servants”; the individual members were “pioneers”.31

The need to

“spread the good news” became central to the beliefs of Jehovah’s Witnesses. And as

Rutherford led the group from the 1920’s into the 1930’s , he became more authoritative

and more strident. Initially the pioneers (the door to door preachers) used personal

testimonies to convert others. Now pioneers were armed with calling cards and literature;
the publications of the group proliferated.32

ministers of Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Their cards identified them as ordained

They carried pamphlets with Witness beliefs

elaborated, or portable phonographs that played four and a half minute recordings of
Judge Rutherford’s speeches on different topics.33 By 1938 the campaign to save the

“multitude” got even more organized: the country was divided into a network of districts,

29
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zones and circuits with regular reports to the central office.34 The Witnesses had a force

of 12,600 volunteers in 78 motorized battalions fighting this war. These groups could

descend on a small town like locusts and reach most members of the community before
anyone could react.35 Indeed, that was a primary reason for the “locust” technique – to

spread the word in spite of local restrictions like license, solicitation or permit

requirements. For the Witnesses were unwilling to abide by such man-made restrictions
on their divine calling.36

As the tempo of the Witnesses’ proselytizing increased in the 1930’s, so did the

opposition to their efforts. Many towns passed ordinances attempting to limit their

practices. The ordinances required permits or licenses to solicit door to door, or to

distribute literature. Some required the payment of fees; others the permission of the
mayor or council.37 In response, Rutherford gathered a staff of attorneys in the central

office to direct the battle against these obstacles. He was fortunate in bringing Hayden

34
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Covington, a spirited and charismatic Witness attorney from Texas, first to aid in, then to
lead a national legal campaign.38
Charles Russell had taught his followers to be obedient to secular government.39

Under Judge Rutherford’s leadership the Witnesses’ position toward earthly government
changed. The “higher powers” referred to in the Bible40 were not secular rulers, but

Jehovah and Christ Jesus.

authority.

Earthly governments therefore had no basis in divine

Witnesses were to obey no human law “unless it was in harmony with

God’s.”41 The new position would cause the Witnesses to take an unyielding stand over

their right to preach door to door and in the streets without submitting to local anti-

solicitation or permit laws. This was because they viewed their preaching as following

God’s law.

The Witnesses viewed their preaching work as “the touchstone of their lives,
central to their very raison d’etre.”42 Indeed, the Watchtower Society teaches that their

preaching to others is essentially the means by which Witnesses attain salvation
38

Newton, supra, p. 48
Mr. James Penton, “Apocalypse Delayed: The Story of Jehovah’s Witnesses,” U. of Toronto Press 1985,
pp. 138-139.
40
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themselves.43 Further, it is this preaching work that will separate those who will share
the earthly kingdom from those who will be damned.44 The ‘great crowd’ – the majority

of Witnesses who are not part of the 144,000 kingdom heirs – must work for their
salvation. And their preaching efforts are a great part of that work.45

The preaching work was not only central to Witness doctrine; it was also central
in the organizational structure.46 The hierarchy of the faith came from the pioneers who

devoted most or all their time to preaching.

Their continued rise depended on

successfully pushing the preaching work; Rutherford ensured this by abolishing the
positions of elders, who were not supporting the preaching.47

The vitriolic nature of Witness preaching, and a message that is often antiestablished religions48 led to many attacks and persecution.49 This caused the Witness

leadership to become even more zealous. Nathan Knorr, Judge Rutherford’s successor in

43
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1942 established minority schools in each congregation and a national missionary
training school called Gilead.50 They also became more militant in carrying their struggle
to deliver their message into the Courts.51

This struggle was as organized and militant as the Witnesses’ preaching. All

Jehovah’s Witnesses were trained in basic legal procedures. Discussions of the law and
trial practice became an integral part of Witnesses’ congregational meetings.52 The

Witnesses’ legal staff prepared and the national headquarter distributed several

publications discussing relevant case law and offering suggestions to Witnesses or how to
use them in defending their actions in Court.53 The local congregations were coached on

how to respond to arresting officers. Mock trials were conducted at local meeting halls

50
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51
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52
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53
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Jehovah’s Witnesses,” supra, p. 129.

11

with procedural tips on preserving issues for appeal.54 A bevy of regional attorneys and
staff from the national office criss-crossed the country handling these cases.55

THE COURT
By the time the first Jehovah’s Witnesses cases came before the Supreme Court56
the Court had endured the “constitutional crisis” of 193757 and begun to reflect the results
of Franklin Roosevelt’s extraordinary number of Court appointments.58 The battle over
the constitutionality of New Deal legislation59 had been resolved by the Court adopting a
policy of judicial restraint.60

54
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55
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56
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US 444(1938) and Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 US 137 (f1939) were the
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57
From 1932-1936 the Court had struck down a number of New Deal legislative initiatives. In frustration
over the Court’s actions President Roosevelt sent a proposal to Congress to reorganize the Federal
judiciary. The proposal would have allowed him to appoint up to six additional justices to the existing
Supreme Court; one for each Justice over the age of 70. Melvin Urofsky, “Division and Discord: The
Supreme Court under Stone and Vinson, 1941-1953” (U. of So. Carolina Press 1997), pp. 1-5 This proposal
split the Democratic party and caused a storm of protest from the bench and bar. Peter J. Renston, “The
Stone Court: Justices, Rulings and Legacy” (ABC-CLIO Supreme Court Handbooks 2001)
58
In August 1937 Justice van de Venter resigned, giving Roosevelt the first of nine appointments to the
Court – Justice Hugo L. Black. Justice Reed was confirmed in January 1938; in 1939 Felix Frankfurter and
William O. Douglas were appointed. Urofsky, supra, Appendix, p. 265; Renstrom, supra, p. 15
59
See footnote 39, supra.
60
On the pre-1937 Court those members who advocated this policy, of deference to government legislation,
were viewed as “liberals”. On the Stone court this would become the “conservative” view. Urofsky, supra,
pp. 1-5.
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Prior to 1937 senior members of the Court adhered to the view that government

had limited authority to adopt legislation affecting property or contract rights unless the
Constitution expressly permitted it.61 The “liberal” bloc of Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo

advocated judicial restraint; a view that permitted government to engage in activity in
these areas if there was no specific constitutional prohibition against it.62 Chief Justice

Hughes and Owen Roberts were “swing votes” on this Court; but Hughes’ aversion to 5

to 4 decisions often led him to join the majority if Roberts voted with the Four Horsemen.

This was the alignment that struck down many New Deal proposals. Roosevelt was so

frustrated with the Court that he sent his “court packing” plan to Congress. Under the

plan, the President could appoint a new justice to the Court if any justices had not retired
within six months of their 70th birthday. The personnel on the Court at the time of the

plan would have given Roosevelt authority to appoint six new justices, expanding the

61

This group – McReynolds, van de Vanter, Butler and Sutherland – became known as the “Four
Horsemen”. Urofsky, supra; see also Douglas, “The Court Years”(Random House, N.Y. 1980), p. 10:
“When I went on the Court I knew former Justice Willis VanDeVanter and George Sutherland casually,
and I had very few contacts with James McReynolds and Pierce Butler. My chief encounter with these
Four Horsemen had been at the Chevy Chase Country Club.”
62
Urofsky, supra.
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Court to 15 members and allowing him to ensure a clear majority for New Deal
legislation.63

Two things averted the crisis and allowed FDR’s plan to die in a Senate

committee. First, Justices Hughes and Roberts voted with the “liberal bloc” and upheld
two pieces of New Deal legislation.64 The second occurrence was the retirements of the
older Justices on the Court.65 Roosevelt’s first appointment was a loyal New Deal
senator who had supported the court-packing proposal – Hugo Black.66 The “Nine Old

Men” had begun to give way. The decision in Lovell v. Griffin was handed down by a

Court still primarily composed of the “Old Men;” only two New Deal justices were on

the Court at that time. Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds, Brandeis, Butler,

Stone and Roberts were holdovers who preceded President Roosevelt’s appointments.

Justice Cardozo was also pre-New Deal, but he was ill and did not participate in any of

the Court’s decisions in the Spring 1938 term of Court, when Lovell was argued and

63

The media declared that the proposal created a constitutional crisis. Urofsky, supra, pp. 1-5.
In March 1937 the Court upheld a state minimum wage law, thanks to Hughes and Roberts’ votes. The
second piece of legislation was a fair labor standards act. This change became known as “the switch in
time that saved nine.” Urofsky, p. 5.
65
In August 1937 Justice Van De Vanter resigned, giving Roosevelt his first of nine appointments to the
Court.
66
Urofsky, p. 17.
64
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decided.67 Justice Black was President Roosevelt’s first appointment to the Court,
replacing Justice VanDeVanter in the fall of 1937.68 Justice Sutherland retired at the

beginning of the Spring term in 1938 and was replaced by Justice Reed January 31,
1938.69 This was the composition of the Court when Lovell was decided. One year later,

when Schneider v. Town of Irvington was decided, Justice Frankfurter had replaced

Cardozo, and Justice Douglas had assumed Brandeis’s seat. Justice Butler was ill at this

time, and did not participate in the decision. So at this time, there were four New Deal

appointments of the eight Justices who heard the Schneider case.

These changes in the Court firmly established “judicial restraint” as a majority

view on the Court. But the doctrine’s limitation to the area of property rights, and the

different views on the Court toward individual rights was already underway before the

Roosevelt appointments arrived. Chief Justice Hughes himself wrote for the Court in
1931 that the 14th Amendment due process clause included the First Amendment
freedoms.70 The assertion that different standards of analysis should apply to legislation

67

303 US Reports, “List of Justices Sitting During this Term of Court,” p.
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69
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affecting property rights than those affecting individual rights, including First

Amendment rights, was presaged by a “liberal bloc” Associate Justice, and Hughes’

successor as Chief Justice, Harlan Stone. This was Stone’s famous “footnote four” in the
Carolene Products case.71 The conflict between Court members’ advocacy of judicial

restraint and the protection of First Amendment freedoms would occupy much of the new

Court appointees’ attention and change the Court from Hughes’ group of consensus

builders to the most fractious group of individuals to ever sit together on the Court.

Thus, at the same time the Court was moving toward deference to the political

branches on economic initiatives; it was beginning to expand the role of the Court as an

enforcer of individual rights.

Before 1937, the Court had only decided a handful of religion cases in its 150plus year history.72 It held firm to its position as “the least dangerous branch” – and its

71

U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152-153, fn. 4 (1938); “these (restrictions affecting civil
liberties) should be subjected to more exacting scrutiny.”
72
Shaw, et al., ed’s, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court,” vol. 3, Sharpe
Library of FDR Studies, (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y. 2004), p. 194.
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Chief Justices reflected that belief.73 Before 1935, the Court did not even have its own
building, but was housed in quarters in the basement of Congress.74

The Court began the process of enforcing individual rights by finding that the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated “basic freedoms” contained in

the Bill of Rights and these freedoms could be enforced against not only the Federal but
state governments.75 The process of “incorporation” of the freedoms enumerated in the
first eight Amendments into the Fourteenth Amendment was continued in the 1930’s.76
When Lovell v. Griffin77 and Schneider v. Town of Irvington78, the first Jehovah’s

Witnesses cases reached the Court, the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press

had been fully incorporated and their protection against state action found coextensive
with their reach against the Federal government.79

73

Hughes modeled his role as Chief Justice on Taft; both believed the Court had a limited role in
democratic government.
74
It may be only coincidence but the Court’s increased role in determining the Constitution’s protection of
individual rights begins shortly after their move into their own quarters.
75
Urofsky, supra, p. 7; Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 562 (1925)
76
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319 (1937)
77
303 US 444(1938)
78
308 US 137 (1939)
79
Gitlow, supra (free speech); Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); Thornhill v.
Alabama, US (these rights have same reach against state as Federal government)
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The analysis the Court applied to determine cases involving individual rights was
also evolving at this time. The “clear and present danger” test enunciated by Holmes80

had set the standard: the government must show a clear and present danger of harm to an
important government interest to warrant abridgment of free speech or press rights.81

While the Court did apply this test to strike down some legislation, the test was still

applied in a manner consistent with the Court’s policy of judicial restraint and deference

to government. This meant the government interest usually prevailed. Then in 1938
Justice Stone wrote his footnote in the Carolene Products82 case, suggesting that the

Court’s use of a deferential analysis of economic legislation, ought to differ when it was
reviewing restrictions affecting civil liberties.83 These restrictions, Stone said, “should be

subjected to more exacting scrutiny” and “statutes directed at particular religious …

minorities” and “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” could call for a “more
searching judicial inquiry” than ordinary legislation.84 The newly reconstituted Court

80

Schenck v. U.S., US (Holmes, J. dissenting)
Id.
82
U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 US 152-153 fn. 4 (1938)
83
Id.
84
Id.
81
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with Black and Reed took up this new analysis and began applying stricter scrutiny in

free speech cases coming before it.

One of the first opportunities presented to the Court to apply this new standard of

scrutiny came in the second Jehovah’s Witness’ case to reach the Court, Schneider v.
Town of Irvington.85 A group of Witnesses were arrested for violating a town ordinance

in Irvington, New Jersey that required a permit from the Chief of Police in order to

canvass door to door to distribute literature. In striking down the ordinance Justice

Roberts echoed the Carolene Products footnote. In cases where the legislative

abridgment of free speech rights was asserted, the Court “should be astute to examine the
effect of the challenged legislation.”86 Legislative preferences or beliefs that may be

sufficient to uphold other legislation may be “insufficient to justify such as diminishes
the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”87 In his

brief in the case, the Witnesses’ lawyer Hayden Covington had argued the ordinance

violated not only free speech rights but the Witnesses’ right to free exercise of their

religion. He urged the Court to extend to religious freedom the same protection enjoyed
85

308 US 147 (1939)
Schneider, supra, at.
87
Id.
86
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by speech and press.88 One year later, in Cantwell v. Connecticut89 the Court did find the

protections of free exercise were incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. By this

time Roosevelt had also made another appointment to the Court – Justice Frank Murphy,

a Catholic Senator and former Governor from Michigan.

In typical Witness style, Newton Cantwell and his two teen-aged sons approached

pedestrians in a heavily Roman Catholic neighborhood in New Haven, Connecticut and
asked permission to play a record on their portable phonograph.90 The recording they

played was “Enemies”, a speech by Judge Rutherford claiming the Catholic Church was

an instrument of Satan, a “great racket” and responsible for untold suffering of
mankind.91The listeners told Cantwell to shut the record off and get moving; Cantwell

and his sons did. They were charged with breach of the peace and with soliciting funds

without a certificate of approval from the state Public Welfare Council. The Council was

empowered to determine whether a cause seeking to solicit funds was “religious or

88

Covington wrote “What mysterious quality can there be in the principles of constitutional law which
prohibits licensing or censoring of the press but authorizes a license for preaching the gospel of God’s
kingdom?” Petitioner’s Brief, Schneider v. Irvington, p. 32
89
310 US 296 (1940)
90
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(Oxford Univ. Press 1998), p. 237
91
Id.
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charitable” or not, and to issue or withhold approval accordingly.92 Justice Roberts again

wrote for the Court. He used the “clear and present danger” test and found there was no

breach of the peace. There was no assault, and the Cantwells were not threatening or
verbally abusive.93 The Court also found the certificate requirement violated the newly

established test for scrutinizing laws abridging free exercise rights: granting a

government official unfettered power to censor the religious practices involved “lay a
forbidden burden upon” the free exercise of religion.94

Justice Roberts was quick to point out, however, that there were limits to this free

exercise right: while the right to hold one’s beliefs was absolute, the right to act on those

beliefs was not. Roberts adhered to a “balancing” test, weighing the individual rights

against the needs of society, to determine whether free exercise or government regulation
would prevail.95

The victories in these three early cases seemed to have secured the constitutional

protection for the Witnesses’ unique style of evangelism. But only two weeks later the
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Court dealt a severe blow to the Witnesses and marked these cases as just the beginning,

not the end, of the Witnesses’ struggles.

One of the tenets of the Witnesses’ faith was that all earthly governments were
corrupt; they waited for the time when God would rule over his earthly kingdom.96 An

offshoot of their belief was their refusal to participate in displays of allegiance to nations

or causes.

They did not vote.97 And after German Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to

perform the Nazi salute and were persecuted, Judge Rutherford announced to American

Witnesses that they, likewise, should not salute the flag or recite the Pledge of
Allegiance.98

The Gobitas family in Minersville, Pennsylvania heard Rutherford’s broadcast
and heeded his words.99 When the children were expelled for refusing to salute the flag,

Gobitas sought an injunction against enforcement of the statute. Both lower Federal
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courts ruled in his favor.100 So it astonished many court-watchers when the Supreme

Court reversed the lower court judgments and upheld the Minersville flag salute
requirement.101 Perhaps even more astonishing was the fact the vote of the Court was 8 to
1, with only Justice Stone dissenting.102 Over the next three years the Jehovah’s
Witnesses brought eight cases to the Supreme Court.103 They lost them all.104

We must look closely at the changing composition of the Court, the individual

Justices appointed and evolving judicial philosophies to understand how the Witnesses

could win their early victories, why they lost their gains just as quickly and what led

ultimately to the remarkable reversal of their fortunes and results on May 3 and June 14,
1943.105
As noted earlier, Lovell v. Griffin106 and Schneider v. Town of Irvington107 , the

Witnesses’ initial victories were decided on free speech and free press grounds. They
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also involved permit requirements that vested unfettered discretion in local officials. As

such, they were treated as “censorship” cases and viewed as simple applications of
existing Court precedent.108
In Lovell, Chief Justice Hughes cited the Gitlow v. New York109 and Near v.
Minnesota110 precedents and treated the permit requirement as a “prior restraint”111.

Justice Roberts’ opinion in Schneider referred to the earlier free press precedents,

including Lovell, as prohibiting “administrative censorship” and equated the permit
requirement in that case to this prohibited burden on a free press.112 Just as importantly,

the Court in both cases reiterated the limited judicial role in reviewing legislation and

stressed that government could enact regulations limiting First Amendment rights. The

only limits placed on government were that these regulations be “reasonably related” to
the government purpose and not “unduly abridge” First Amendment freedoms.113
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The Cantwell case, another early Witness victory, did represent an expansion of

the law; but it was an evolutionary, not revolutionary advance. Cantwell extended the

Fourteenth Amendment protection of First Amendment rights to include the right to free
exercise of religion.114 But the Court simply noted the free exercise clause was part of

the First Amendment. The Court then analogized the statute, which prohibited religious

or charitable solicitation without approval of the state secretary of public welfare, to a

“prior restraint.”

115

In this respect the statute was no different than statutes imposing

such restraints on free speech and press which the Court had already struck down, in

Lovell and other cases. The Court found the discretion placed in the state official
permitted arbitrary and capricious decisions amounting to “censorship of religion”.116 In

this context the Court’s decision did not make new law. And Justice Roberts went on to

stress the Court’s adherence to its restrained “balancing of interests” test. He reiterated

the Court’s role was limited to determining whether the legitimate power to regulate was

114
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exercised by the state in such a way as to unduly infringe on protected rights.117 Here the

unfettered discretion given to the secretary to determine “legitimate” religions and

charities crossed that line. But the Court again stressed that general regulations that

didn’t involve religious tests or obstruct the collection of funds would not violate the
Constitution.118

The Gobitis case involved just such a general requirement: it was a neutral

regulation, applicable to all school children. It didn’t involve determining what a

legitimate religion was or relate to the ability to solicit funds.

At the time Cantwell and Gobitis were decided in 1940, then, there were five
Roosevelt appointees on the Court.119 To understand how this group could vote against

the Witnesses in the Gobitis decision and reverse itself within three years, we must look

at the internal working of the Court during this period and the individual Justices’

philosophies about law and judging.
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The Roosevelt appointees were definitely not all of a piece. Roosevelt seems not

to have had any particular judicial philosophy he wanted the Court to reflect. Rather, his

initial appointments were primarily made to install good New Deal supporters on the

Court. He thought this would ensure the Court would uphold his massive legislative

agenda. These appointments and Roosevelt’s subsequent appointments to the Court were
all very pragmatic decisions.120 The New Deal justices also took a new approach to

decision making. They had little of the attachment to precedent that characterized the

earlier Court. This change began during the latter days of Hughes’ reign as Chief Justice,

and became full-blown when Stone succeeded Hughes.

Chief Justice Hughes presided over the end of one era on the Court and the

beginning of another. Hughes followed the practice established by Chief Justice John
Marshall of trying to have the Court issue one opinion on cases.121 As a result, he viewed
the Chief Justices’ function as trying to find a consensus among the members.122 His

efforts may have been most apparent during the period leading up to the 1937 “court
120
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packing” plan.123 Although he may have been more liberal in his views than the “Four
Horsemen,”124 Hughes and Justice Roberts would join with them in cases, to avoid
having the Court issue decisions that were split 5 to 4.125 But Hughes also used the
position of Chief Justice aggressively to try to enforce a consensus.126 He dominated the
discussion of cases at conference through the force of his personality127 and the
traditional rule honored at case conferences128. Hughes would state his position first,
with boldness and assurance.129 He limited the other justices’ discussion.130 He also spoke

last, reviewing the discussion and pointing out his agreement with, or dissent from, the

other views expressed. The justices then voted, with Hughes’s views and comments
freshest in their minds.131 Hughes’s command of the facts and law in conferences,
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speaking without notes, left junior justices in awe.132 And again, according to custom, the

junior justices voted first on the cases.

The Court Hughes originally presided over was primarily concerned with

property rights. The Court he left in 1941 had begun the shift to the modern era’s focus
on individual liberties.133 Ironically, it was concern over limiting judicial activism that led

to this change and justices originally labeled “liberals” who became the staunchest

dissenters to the Court’s views on civil rights.

The beginnings of the struggle came soon after the personnel changes began. By

the time the Gobitis case came before the Court there were four relatively new, and

inexperienced, Justices sitting. Chief Justice Hughes presided over the conference with

his usual efficiency.

134

At the conference on the case, Hughes introduced the

controversial issue regarding the flag salute by saying “I come up to this case like a
skittish horse to a brass band.”135 He then went on to insist the case had “nothing to do

with religion” but was a question of the State’s power to inculcate an important “social
132
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objective” and stated his opinion that the State did have such power.136 Next Frankfurter

spoke passionately about the role of schools in instilling patriotism from his own

immigrant experience. Hughes was moved by the speech and assigned the writing of the

opinion in the case to Frankfurter because, as Hughes said, “an immigrant could really
speak of the flag as a patriotic symbol.”137
The Gobitis decision and Frankfurter’s opinion surprised most civil libertarians.138

The Court’s previous decisions seemed clearly to establish protection for freedom of
religion against State infringement.139 And Stone had espoused a less deferential analysis
when viewing state infringements of individual rights.140 Frankfurter was the defender of
Sacco and Vanzetti, the inheritor of the mantle of Holmes and Cardozo.141 Justice

Murphy had established the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department during his
stint as Attorney General to protect individual rights.142 And Black and Douglas would be

136

Newman, supra
Id.
138
Lash, “From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter”, pp. 69-70
139
Cantwell v. Connecticut, US
140
Carolene Products, supra
141
Lash, “From the Diaries”, supra, p. 69
142
On establishing the Civil Liberties Unit, later the Civil Rights Division, Murphy said “an important
function of the …government is the aggressive protection of the fundamental rights inherent in a free
people.” Fine, “Frank Murphy: The Washington Years”, p. 79
137

30

the architects of the “absolute” position of First Amendment protections.143 Then how

could this decision have happened?

The court-packing plan was still a recent memory, for one thing. The reasoning

that led to it was also still fresh in the Justices’ minds. The new and holdover members

of the Court were all advocates of judicial restraint in the context of interfering with the

government’s power to legislate. That was the main reason they were appointed or
remained on the Court – to ensure Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation was upheld.144

A second factor explaining the ruling was that Hughes was still Chief Justice.

And he had five very “junior” Justices sitting with him. They were all much younger,

and had little previous judicial experience. Black had been on the Court the longest –
only three terms.145 His previous judicial experience was on a state court trial bench.

Douglas was thirty-nine years old when he was appointed; he had been a law professor at

Yale and Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission but had no prior

143
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judicial experience.146 The most experienced judge of the new appointees, Murphy, also
had experience as a trial court judge but no appellate experience.147 Frankfurter was the

only one who came to the Court with a background that seemed to prepare him for the

job. He had been a law professor for many years. He had studied the Court and written
about its workings for twenty-five years.148 Both Douglas and Murphy expected
Frankfurter to be their leader on the Court; both admired him greatly.149

Justice Stone, who had been on the Court with Hughes since 1925 thought

Frankfurter was the only one of the new Justices on the Court with the legal resources “to
face Hughes in conference and hold his own in discussion.”150

So at the time of the Gobitis conference, it was likely true that only Hughes and
Frankfurter spoke.151 Black, Murphy and Douglas all spoke about how “moved” they
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were by Frankfurter’s passionate discussion of patriotism at the conference.152 The

discussion obviously made an impression on Hughes also, to assign Frankfurter the

writing of the opinion because “an immigrant could really speak of the flag as a patriotic
symbol.”153

But the force of Hughes’s leadership must receive most of the credit for

producing an 8 to 1 decision in the case. Other explanations are less convincing. Black,

Douglas and Murphy all say they had reservations about the opinion but didn’t express
them.154 Black says he, Douglas and Murphy didn’t want to break their word to
Frankfurter after telling him they would support him.155 But Black wrote notes to

Frankfurter suggesting changes to the opinion, which Frankfurter made. And Black had

not had a problem taking stands on the Court against other members. In his first term on
the Court he wrote eight solo dissenting opinions.156 Black’s views on the First

Amendment were clearly not aligned with Frankfurter’s. In an earlier Jehovah’s
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Witnesses’ leafleting case, Schneider v. City of Irvington157 Black had drafted a rewrite

of Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court. In the draft Black expressed the view that

freedom of speech and press were made secure against all invasions by the express

prohibitory language of the Constitution and these rights must not be abridged regardless
of the cost of their protection.158 Black suggests he knew immediately the decision in

Gobitis was wrong and he, Douglas and Murphy decided to correct it as soon as they
could.159

The opinion Frankfurter wrote in Gobitis also appealed directly to the one
unifying jurisprudential philosophy on the Court, the belief in judicial restraint.160

The junior justices continued to “feel their way” on the Court. Over the next two

years the Witnesses sought eight times to get their religious practices protected by the

Court. In six instances the Court denied certiorari; in the other two the Court found there

157
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was no free exercise right involved161. During this time they continued to develop their

own judicial philosophies; philosophies that could square their belief in judicial restraint

with aggressive protection of individual freedoms. Each of them found their philosophies

partly in unique individual sources, and partly in each other.

Justice Black found his jurisprudence from studying the original debates over the

Fourteenth Amendment. He became convinced the drafters intended to apply all of the
Bill of Rights to the States.162 He also believed that judicial restraint in applying the

Constitution meant an absolute position on the Bill of Rights. This limited the discretion
of individual Justices to decide the parameters of these freedoms.163
Black and Douglas were extraordinarily close ideologically.164 They both felt the

Bill of Rights provided “pretty sturdy standards” for what constituted due process under
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the Fourteenth Amendment.165 They also shared a belief that the intent of the Constitution
was to remove First Amendment freedoms from legislative consideration.166 Douglas’s

background in the “legal realism” movement at Yale meshed with Black’s lack of respect

for precedent. Both believed the Court played an important role in establishing public
policy.167 They also thought adherence to “process”, Frankfurter’s mantra, without any

regard for the substantive issues involved in individual cases led to a sterile
jurisprudence.168

Justice Murphy also shared this view. He was “result-oriented” and also no
respecter of “stare decisis”.169 Murphy didn’t care much for “technical questions”; to him,
the objectives of the law were “justice and human dignity”.170 Eventually he adopted
Stone’s view of the “preferred position” of the First Amendment as his own.171 A devout

Catholic, Murphy also thought that freedom of religion was most “preferred”: the best
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way to secure his own faith, he reasoned, was to ensure the security of everyone else”s.172

After initially looking to Frankfurter for leadership, it was Black who most impressed

Murphy. He respected Black’s intellect and his heart. He believed Black could be
trusted to defend religious freedom.173The three became the new bloc of votes on the

Court; Frankfurter derisively referred to them as “the Axis”.

Frankfurter’s professorial habits manifested themselves in another way that

shifted power to Black, Douglas and Murphy during this period. He pored over his

opinions, writing and rewriting them; most became “tomes” on the history of the

development of a doctrine. As a result, he was able to handle a smaller share of the

Court’s caseload than the others. And he was assigned fewer and fewer opinions, while
the others received a larger share of the Court’s work.174

Wiley Rutledge had always believed the law should be practical. He had great

empathy for the less fortunate. He believed in full incorporation of the Bill of Rights and

172

Fine, supra, p. 372; this is probably why one critic noted that if Murphy was ever nominated for
sainthood, it would be by the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
173
Murphy said Black had a “primitive, powerful intellect…and the heart of a lion.” Fine, supra, p. 191
174
Black and Douglas received thirty to forty assignments per term, Frankfurter nine or ten. Douglas, “The
Court Years”, p. 223. Murphy was proud he carried his share of the Court’s work. Fine, supra, p.

37

that they played an important role in protecting the rights of minorities.175 His

appointment to the Court, when added to the “Axis” and Justice Stone would mean a

solid group of supporters for the First Amendment and set the state for a distinctly

focused period in the development of the free exercise doctrine.

The one justice on the Court who already had a clearly articulated vision for

reconciling these two concepts was Justice Stone. Stone was a holdover on the Court.

He had been allied with Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo – they were his mentors when he

was a junior justice. He was allied with them in the “liberal bloc” and voted with them to

establish the doctrine of judicial restraint. He had expressed his view on the subject
clearly.176 But Stone also authored the famous footnote in Carolene Products.177 In that

Stone held true to this philosophy in the Gobitis case. His was the only dissenting voice.

Unfortunately, Stone did not speak out at the conference on the case, and passed when
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the justices were casting their votes.178 As a holdover on the Court, he still adhered to

Hughes’s approach to try to express consensus, and limit the dissenting views
expressed.179 When he did finally decide he could not agree with the majority and must

write, it was too late. His dissenting opinion was circulated only the day before the

conference on Frankfurter’s draft of the majority opinion; and unlike Frankfurter, he
didn’t campaign for support for his views.180 As a result, Black, Douglas and Murphy

kept their word to Frankfurter and went along with the majority in the case.

Their reticence, if it existed, is difficult to gauge from hindsight. Black, as
indicated earlier, says the justices knew immediately they had made a mistake.181 But of

course they continued to vote against the Witnesses in eight other cases over the next two
years. Douglas says that over time they realized the decision was wrong.182 This

comports more with their voting on the Witnesses cases over the next few years. It also

is consistent with Douglas’s legal realism; the continued cases coming to the Court from

the Witnesses alleging the persecution of their views eventually convinced him the issues
178
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in these “neutral” ordinance challenges were about freedom of religion, contrary to

Hughes’ and Frankfurter’s assertions in Gobitis and later cases that that had nothing to do

with it.

The one clear record of one of these junior justices’ initial reluctance to join in the

decision is found in Frank Murphy’s papers. Justice Murphy actually drafted a dissent in

the case, but did not circulate it. In the draft, he stressed the importance of protecting

freedom of conscience, “(e)specially at the time when (it) is being placed in
jeopardy….”183 The persuasive power of Chief Justice Hughes seems to have convinced
Murphy not to file his dissent, and to go along with the Court’s majority opinion.184

Murphy was a freshman Justice, still in awe of Hughes and not yet disillusioned with
Frankfurter.185

Over the next two years as well, the dynamics of the relationship among all these

Justices changed. Black, Murphy and Douglas all drifted away from Frankfurter, and
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towards each other. Murphy first disagreed with Frankfurter on a case in January, 1941
(six months after Gobitis). He disagreed with Frankfurter six more times that term.186

Black had preceded Frankfurter on the Court. But Black was a politician, not a
law professor. And he had graduated from the University of Alabama, not Harvard.187

He was new to the Court when Justice Cardozo advocated the idea of “selective
incorporation” of the Bill of Rights protections in the Fourteenth Amendment.188 Black

loved, and admired Cardozo; again he “went along”. But as time passed on the Court,

Black became opposed to selective incorporation. It ran contrary to his belief that the

Justices should have limited discretion in interpreting the reaches of the freedoms in the
Bill of Rights.189 By 1941, after four terms on the Court, Black began to feel comfortable
with his own “constitutional faith”. 190

Two other factors contributed to the Court’s changing approach to individual

rights issues. They also resulted in the Court becoming the most divided Court in
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history.191 They were Hughes’ retirement as Chief Justice and his replacement by Harlan

Stone, and the distinct personality of Felix Frankfurter.

In June 1941, Justice Stone succeeded Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice.

Stone and Roberts were holdovers on the New Deal Court. He had been an Associate

Justice since 1925. He had come to the Court after a career as a law professor and Dean
at Columbia.192Oliver Wendell Holmes had been Stone’s mentor on the Court. Felix

Frankfurter was a professional colleague he admired. Although he was a Republican and

one of the “Nine Old Men” from the old Court, Frankfurter urged Roosevelt to appoint

Stone Chief Justice to demonstrate his nonpartisan attitudes, “especially important in time
of war.”193 Hughes, as well as Justice Murphy, favored Black or Jackson for the position,

but supported the Stone nomination. Stone himself did not seem to care about the
appointment.194 He planned his summer vacation, telling friends he expected Robert
Jackson to get the appointment.195 He discounted the importance of the post, telling his

family the job was like a law school dean’s: “he does what the janitor is unable or
191
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unwilling to do.”196 Still, when the appointment came, he wondered whether he was up to
the task.197

Some of his colleagues on the Court were already certain he was not. Douglas

predicted in a letter to Black that the Court “will not be a particularly happy or congenial
atmosphere in which to work.”198 Stone’s promotion led to rapid deterioration of the

consensus-building atmosphere established by Chief Justice Hughes. Several factors

contributed to this. Stone was personally aloof; he lacked the personality or commanding
presence of Hughes. Douglas said Stone never knew how “the other half” lived.199 He

also seems to have lacked the tact necessary to garner broad agreements of the other

Justices. He wrote an article critical of Black for his lack of legal knowledge and
experience.200 He thought of Murphy as an inferior intellect he needed to teach.201 Stone

also didn’t like Murphy or Douglas because of their continuing political ambitions; they
both seemed to Stone to want to be somewhere besides the Court.202
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Stone’s conception of the role of the Chief Justice and the purpose of the Court’s

conferences also contributed to the fractioning of the Court. Stone didn’t agree with

Hughes and Taft, his predecessors in the position, about the importance of unanimous or

“massed” opinions. He felt there was great value in dissenting opinions. Of course, he
had served with the two great dissenters in the Court’s history, Holmes and Brandeis.203

Stone likewise disagreed with Hughes’ tight control over discussion at the conferences.

Even as an Associate Justice, he began holding “rump conferences” with other Justices to

allow more discussion and debate of the cases. As Chief Justice, he held more, and
longer, conferences on the cases.204 All the Justices complained about the length and
inefficiency of the conferences.205 Murphy noted that at some point Stone and Frankfurter

would speak at length in the conferences. Sometimes Black contributed; the others
usually didn’t say much.206 Stone’s biographer blames the length of the conferences, the
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delays in opinions and the increasing dissents not on Stone, but on Felix Frankfurter’s
penchant for debate.207

The personality of Felix Frankfurter was clearly the second important factor in the

changing beliefs and attitudes on the Court that ultimately led to the revolution in their

approach to Free Exercise cases. As noted earlier, Stone believed Frankfurter was the

only New Deal justice with the background and experience to challenge Hughes. He also

challenged Stone. But instead of leading the junior Justices who expected him to be their
“knight”, he became one of the great disappointments of all time on the bench.208

Frankfurter’s personality and intellectual elitism, like Stone’s, contributed to his
alienation of the other new Justices.209 He could never stop being a professor; he lectured
his colleagues in conference210, belittled their intelligence or judicial ability211, berated
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lawyers at oral argument212 and wrote lengthy opinions that were difficult to read and
understand.213

Douglas described Frankfurter coming to conferences with stack of books. On his

turn to speak, he would read from the books and throw them around the table for the
other Justices to look at.214 His penchant for debate made the conferences longer, delayed
opinions and led to more dissents.215 Stone’s willingness to allow long discussions at
conference led Frankfurter to give “seemingly endless lectures”.216 His insulting of
Murphy’s intellect alienated not only Murphy but other Justices.217 But he had vitriol

enough for all his colleagues. He called Black a “self-righteous, self-deluded part
demagogue, part fanatic”.218 He decried Douglas’s ambition and thought Douglas was
more interested in being President himself than being on the Court.219 A biographer of the

212
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Stone court agreed with Stone’s biographer that Frankfurter was responsible for much of
the bickering on the Court at the time.220 He attributes Frankfurter’s “poisoning of the

well” of collegiality to Frankfurter’s frustration at not having the leadership on the Court
he thought belonged to him.221

Explicit indications of Frankfurter’s frustrations can be found in his diary entries

for 1943. Frankfurter reports a conversation with Douglas concerning Black changing

his mind about the Gobitis decision. Frankfurter inquires whether Black has been reading

the Constitution over the summer recess; Douglas replies “No, he’s been reading the
newspapers”. 222 The story is one of the most popular anecdotes told about the Justices

change of position on the flag salute . It suggests that Black, and Douglas, changed their

position because of the intense publicity about attacks on Jehovah’s Witnesses in the

aftermath of the Gobitis decision, rather than a sincere belief that the Constitutional

interpretation was wrong. One of Black’s biographers believes the conversation, and

others for that period in Frankfurter’s diaries, are invented from whole cloth and reflect
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the depths of his frustration during this period.223 There is some support for this
assertion. Douglas never mentions this conversation in his autobiography.224 Black,

Douglas and Murphy independently recount a number of conversations they had
regarding the original decision, their change of position and correcting the ruling.225

Another entry during this period critical of Black is contradicted by other sources.
226

Regardless whether the comments are injudicious or “outright false” as Black’s
biographer believes227 the results of Frankfurter’s histrionics and Stone’s ineptitude were

to drive the other members of the Court to band together and to develop their own
competing jurisprudence.228 The architect of a new view of the First Amendment and the

leader of the group opposing Frankfurter was Hugo L. Black.

Black was Roosevelt’s first selection to fill a Court vacancy in August 1937. He

was a loyal New Deal supporter in the Senate and had supported the President’s court-

packing plan. Some even thought his appointment was a slap at the Senate for rejecting
223
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the President’s proposal.229Justice Stone’s intemperate comments to a reporter expressing

his views critical of Black’s “lack of legal knowledge and experience” were published
before Black even took his seat.230

But Black had a fine mind, and was an insatiable reader. When Frankfurter told

Black he was a Benthamite, Black ordered several of Jeremy Bentham’s works to read to
understand Frankfurter’s allusion.231

Black was opposed to judicial subjectivity, which he saw as a major source of

mischief. Thus, although he acquiesced in Cardozo’s idea of “selective incorporation” of

the Bill of Rights initially, he changed his view in part because he thought it gave too

much discretion to the Justices to determine constitutional parameters. His own view of

judicial restraint viewed limitations on the Justice’s discretion as essential to following
the Framer’s intent.232

229

Urofsky, supra p. 17
Marquis Childs, “The Supreme Court Today”, Harper’s Magazine (May 1938)
231
James F. Simon, “The Antagonists: Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter and Civil Liberties in Modern
America”, Simon and Schuster, N.Y., N.Y. 1989, pp. 102, 173
232
Mark Silverstein, “Constitutional Faiths: Felix Frankfurter, Hugo Black and the Process of Judicial
Decision-making”, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. 1984, pp. 129-130
230

49

Stone’s low opinion of Black’s capabilities led him to ask his friend Frankfurter
to give some guidance to Black after Black’s appointment.233 Frankfurter took to the task

with his usual vigor, lecturing Black often at Washington parties and meetings where

their paths crossed. Unfortunately, Frankfurter treated Black as he did his students and
his patronizing attitude resulted in Black mostly rejecting his views.234

Within three years, Frankfurter’s assumed leadership of the liberal wing of the
Court was obliterated and had been assumed by Black.235 It was Frankfurter’s perception

that his colleagues had strayed. In truth, it was Frankfurter who had drifted from his
libertarian views.236 And his increasing stridence and refusal to adapt his positions
allowed Black to assume his leadership position on the Court.237

The shift was ironic since the two started out in agreement on the question of

judicial restraint. Both felt the Nine Old Men had abused the Fourteenth Amendment in
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not deferring to Congress on the New Deal legislation.238 But neither man suggested the

Court should show such deference when the issue involved protection of individual

liberties. Frankfurter said as much when he said these issues came to the Court with a
“special claim for constitutional protection”.239 The fundamental question for both men

was how to give meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment without having the Court

indulge in subjective decision-making. It was their different answers to this question and

their different approaches to advocating their position with their colleagues that led to the

dramatic decline of Frankfurter and the ascension of Black as leader of the liberal bloc

and caused Black’s constitutional faith to be reflected in the Jehovah’s Witnesses cases.

Frankfurter had studied the Court for many years and thought he knew best how

the Court should approach these issues. They should study history, look at Court

precedents and use their own “sense of fairness and decency” to determine the limits of
constitutional protection.240 Black believed such an approach would result in the Court

“making law” the same way they had in striking down the New Deal legislation. This

was Black’s view of judicial restraint. He preferred to anchor the interpretation of the
238
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meaning in the words used in the amendment itself and the views expressed by the

sponsors of the amendment as a mandate to enforce the Bill of Rights against state
encroachment.241 Black believed this best prevented subjective decision making by the
Court members – in other words, it would further the idea of judicial restraint.242

Contrary to Frankfurter’s view that Black and others had abandoned judicial restraint,

Black’s views remained remarkably consistent. As early as 1929 in a debate on the

Senate floor over legislation to ban certain foreign literature Black called free speech a

“sacred privilege” and said he could not vote for any measure that tended “in the slightest
degree” to restrict it.243 On the Court, Black advocated the same position. In Cox v. New
Hampshire244 the Court upheld the conviction of Jehovah’s Witnesses for not complying

with a parade permit requirement. The Court found the permit requirement a

“reasonable” exercise of legislative discretion. In the first of many of their debates over

the essential meaning of the First Amendment Black insisted the word “reasonable” be

stricken from the opinion because it suggested the Court could use its subjective
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judgment to decide the issue.245 Frankfurter believed the term gave the Court limited

discretion, but agreed to the omission because he thought without the qualifier it was

more clear the Court could exercise its own judgment. It was the first of several times he
underestimated Black as an adversary.246

Frankfurter’s arrogance also led him to be ineffective in soliciting his colleagues

to support his position. Frankfurter continued to lecture Douglas and Murphy on the

meaning of the First Amendment; Black was a better politician and knew how to

persuade his colleagues without lecturing. Further, regardless of his personal estimation
of his colleagues he did not belittle or disparage them as Frankfurter did.247

Douglas like the others had admired Frankfurter for his defense of Sacco and

Vanzetti. Douglas and Murphy were in a group of FDR cronies who celebrated
Frankfurter’s appointment to the Court, expecting him to lead the liberal wing.248 On the

first flag case they waited to hear his views. When their champion of civil liberties found

no First Amendment protection they went along with him despite their reservations. But
245
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his calculated use of histrionics at conferences, his constant politicking for votes on the

cases and his demeaning attitude soon cased Douglas to abandon Frankfurter and his
views.249

Black was a natural ally for Douglas. Both were country boys who were
suspicious of concentrations of power.250 Both thought a jurisprudence that valued
process over the result was too mechanical and sterile.251 Black came to view the

protection of individual liberties as the primary role of the Constitution in the balance of
powers, one providing the best defense against overreaching government.252 Douglas
shared that view.253

Justice Murphy was singled out for a lion’s share of Frankfurter’s vitriol.

Frankfurter thought Murphy unqualified for the Court; Murphy himself thought the
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same.254 Roosevelt’s reasons for appointing Murphy were he was another loyal New

Dealer who believed the Courts should defer to Congress on economic issues. He was

also a Catholic from the Midwest as was Pierce Butler whom he replaced.

Murphy had little use for “technical” questions. His was a visceral jurisprudence,
based on a belief that “justice and human dignity” were the objectives of decisions.255

While Black and Douglas articulated judicial philosophies for their decisions,

they clearly appreciated Murphy’s belief that getting the right result was most important.
Black said if Murphy “ever did the wrong thing, it was for the right reason.”256 Douglas

noted that Murphy had “common sense, a keen orientation to the Constitution and Bill of
Rights and a sense of the relevancy of facts.”257 Looking back on this tumultuous time

on the Court, Douglas felt he made more mistakes not following Murphy than not
following Frankfurter.258
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As the rift between Frankfurter and the other New Deal appointees grew,
Frankfurter began referring to the three as “the Axis,”259 equating them with our wartime

enemies Germany, Italy and Japan. During this period the Court members changed their

opinions frequently after the initial votes were taken and draft opinions were circulated.
Their lack of adherence to precedent was reflected in over 30 decisions overruled.260

By the time he reached his third term in 1939, Black was comfortable on the

Court. And he began asserting more forcefully his view of the First Amendment’s

central importance to our constitutional system. With his politician’s skills, he quickly

won converts on the Court. Douglas, the Westerner, came from Yale and the school of

‘legal realism.’ The Constitution was not a ‘static’ document, but one that changed and

adapted to the times, to ensure ‘just’ results. Murphy also joined the group. His was a

‘visceral’ jurisprudence, again more interested in results than doctrine. And he had a

special feeling for the protection of religious freedom and minorities. All were now

alienated from Frankfurter and seeking out their own jurisprudence. Stone couldn’t lead

them, with their strong personalities and non-judicious temperaments. It was Black who
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articulated their constitutional faith, and in so doing transformed First Amendment free

exercise jurisprudence.

The effect of the tremendous turnover in personnel and the different philosophies

of the new Justices on the Court toward unanimity and precedent are reflected in

statistics on the lack of consensus during much of the period. From 1930 through 1936

there were the two coherent blocs – the liberal wing of Stone, Cardozo and Brandeis and

the conservative “Four Horsemen.” When Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts

joined with the liberal bloc to uphold the New Deal legislation the Court had a solid
majority on most issues.261

But this solid bloc was short-lived. In 1937 with Black’s appointment the
percentage of non-unanimous decisions nearly doubled.262 Black himself was

responsible for much of the increase, with eleven solo dissents. Hughes’ attempts to

establish a consensus are also reflected; the Chief Justice agreed with every opinion

261
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rendered.263 From 1938 through 1940, as Frankfurter and Douglas joined the Court, then

Murphy, the percentage of non-unanimous decisions continued to rise. At the same time,

the development of a new bloc of Justices with broad agreement on the cases began to

develop. During this same period, Black continues to file more and more dissents. But

he is no longer alone: from 1938 through 1940, Douglas agrees with Black on every
decision, and Murphy joins both on almost all decisions.264

Frankfurter’s eroding leadership position is also reflected in the statistics for the

Court’s work during this period. In his first three terms on the Court, Frankfurter only

dissented seven times. But in 1941, when Byrnes and Jackson joined the Court, and

Stone took over as Chief Justice, the breakdown of consensus became complete.

Frankfurter doubled his number of dissents in this one term. And Justices Douglas, Black
and Stone dissented more than Frankfurter.265

But it must be noted these disagreements reflect more than just the personality

differences and feuds between individual Justices. Once the battle over New Deal

legislation had been won, the Court’s docket was increasingly filled with narrower, more
263
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“thorny” questions of constitutional interpretation, where the vagueness of the language

and questions about where the balance between government authority and individual
liberties would be struck occupied most of the Court’s time.266 As noted earlier, before

1935 the Court had only heard a handful of cases regarding the First Amendment.

Thanks in part to Jehovah’s Witnesses the Court heard more individual liberties cases
during this period than in its entire previous history.267

Again, the Roosevelt Justices’ political backgrounds, a complaint of Frankfurter’s

,do not explain their differences. Justice Reed, who voted with Frankfurter often, was

Solicitor General; Jackson who only supported the Witnesses on the second flag case,

like Murphy had been Attorney General. So had Chief Justice Stone and Justice

McReynolds. Six ex-governors (like Murphy) and ten ex-senators (like Black) had been
among the twenty Justices appointed to the Court in the forty year period prior to 1937.268

THE CASES

266

Pritchett, supra, p. 30.
The Court issued decisions in twenty-six cases brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses between 1938 and 1943.
Westlaw search (on file with author) and civil liberties cases accounted for 34 of the Court’s nonunanimous decisions between 1939 and 1947. Pritchett, supra, p. 129.
268
Pritchett, supra, pp. 12-14.
267

59

After the Gobitis269 decision, the Witnesses continued to press the Court to protect

their proselytizing from ‘neutral’ laws. The Witnesses argued the Court should treat

these laws the same as prior restraints on free speech, and give their free exercise rights
the same protection.270 But Frankfurter’s argument from Gobitis continued to hold a

majority, though support for the idea weakened as the cases continued to come before the

Court and Witnesses were being subjected to physical attacks in communities across the
country.271 Through eight attempts the advocates of judicial restraint held firm.272
Finally, in Jones v. Opelika273, the split on the Court reached 5 to 4. Moreover,

the dissenting opinions were memorable. Chief Justice Stone articulated the “preferred

position” doctrine for First Amendment freedoms, expressing his belief that free speech

and free exercise rights must be protected against indirect infringements like license taxes
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as well as direct attacks.274 Justice Murphy had rejected the Witnesses’ arguments in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire275 (the “fighting words” case) refusing to extend the First

Amendment to protect the actions of Chaplinsky in that case. In the other cases lost by

the Witnesses during this period the Court had characterized the Witnesses’ distribution

of pamphlets and proselytizing as “commercial” speech, entitled to no more protection
than a door to door salesperson.276 But in his Jones dissent, Justice Murphy adopted the

Witnesses’ arguments that these activities were integral to the practices of their faith. He

stated the Witnesses were “disseminating their faith as they saw it,” and argued the
license tax ordinance taxed their “ideas” in violation of the First Amendment.277

The third dissenting opinion was authored by Black and joined by Douglas and

Murphy. The “Axis” members openly professed their belief not only that the Jones case

was being wrongly decided, but that the analysis was the result of the Gobitis reasoning.
And, they said, they would now reverse their votes in Gobitis278. The Witnesses’ beliefs

that their preaching activities were the exercise of their religion and should receive as
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much protection as free speech was accorded,279 was now put forth as the constitutional
faiths of these four Justices.280

The Justices needed another convert to establish this “faith” as the “law of the

land,” however. Within months, it happened. Justice Byrnes resigned to head the
government’s war mobilization efforts.281 President Roosevelt nominated Wiley
Rutledge to replace him.282 Murphy had nominated Rutledge for the D.C. Court of
Appeals when Murphy was Attorney General.283 When Murphy took credit for

‘discovering’ Rutledge, Justice Frankfurter said he had told Roosevelt even before

Frankfurter’s own appointment, that Rutledge was “entirely qualified” for the Supreme
Court.284

In fact, Roosevelt had considered Rutledge for several of the previous vacancies
on the Court.285 Rutledge headed a group of law professors who had supported the
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President’s “court packing” plan.286 While on the Court of Appeals he had also authored
an opinion supportive of Jehovah’s Witnesses in an anti-picketing ordinance case.287
Murphy cited the Busey opinion in his own dissent in Jones v. Opelika.288 Rutledge took
his seat on the Court February 15, 1943.289 Four days later the Court voted to have reargument in Jones v. Opelika and granted certiorari in Martin v. Struthers.290 On May 3,
1943 the Court handed down decisions in thirteen Jehovah’s Witnesses’ cases.291 All
were favorable to the Witnesses.292 One of the decisions was the Court’s reversal of its
own recent precedent in Jones v. Opelika.293 Martin v. Struthers, relied on by the Court
in its most recent decision for Jehovah’s Witnesses, was another.294 A third decision was
Murdoch v. Pennsylvania.295 Writing for the Court in Murdoch, Justice Douglas

established Stone’s “preferred position” for First Amendment freedoms as the law of the
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case.296 He also made clear the Witnesses’ preaching and door to door solicitation were
religious exercises, an “age old form of evangelism” as old as the Republic itself.297

Recognition of the Witnesses’ practices as part of their religion and establishing strict

scrutiny as the standard when legislation impacted on these practices spelled doom for

the advocates of judicial restraint. One month later, on Flag Day, June 6, 1943 the Court
reversed its decision in Gobitis.298 This second reversal by the Court was called “one of

the most notable acts in the entire span of one hundred fifty four years of Supreme Court
history.”299 It firmly established the Witnesses’ beliefs about free exercise of religion as

the law of the land. And it represented the constitutional faiths of Stone, Black, Douglas,

Murphy and Rutledge as well: the First Amendment was entitled to special protection

against state and Federal intrusion.
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The first Jehovah’s Witnesses case came before the Court in 1938.300 After their

1943 victories only four Jehovah’s Witnesses cases came before the Court the next three

terms. Their battle was over; they had won.

CONCLUSION

The stream of Witnesses cases suddenly had become a trickle. And the alignment

of Justices who shared their constitutional faith disappeared almost as swiftly. On April

22, 1946 Chief Justice Stone fell ill while announcing the Court’s decisions; he died later
that day and was replaced by Fred M. Vinson.301 Wiley Rutledge was only on the Bench

for six years; he died of a cerebral hemorrhage at age 55, just a few months after Justice
Murphy.302 Frank Murphy died in hospital during the summer recess in 1949. His last

opinion, a dissent, could stand as a statement of the lasting legacy of the Court’s

decisions in the Witnesses’ cases: “Law is at its loftiest when it examines claims of
injustice even at the instance of one to whom the public is bitterly hostile.”303
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Jehovah’s Witnesses pursued their beliefs into the courts. They believed their

freedom to practice their religion should embrace their door to door preaching so they

opposed anti-solicitation ordinances. They felt their peddling of literature for donations

was part of their calling to spread their faith and they shouldn’t pay taxes or need licenses

to exercise their beliefs, couldn’t be taxed, so they refused to pay license fees. Saluting

the flag or pledging allegiance was in their belief worshipping false idols, and so they

refused.

At the same time Jehovah’s Witnesses were asserting their right to practice their

beliefs to the courts, the members of the Supreme Court were developing their own

“constitutional faith.” Stone asserted the Court should give more protection to individual

rights than it did commerce. Black and Douglas agreed and developed their belief that

the best way for the Court to protect these rights was to limit government authority to act

in areas involving the First Amendment. Murphy and Rutledge shared Douglas’s legal

realism, and thought the best jurisprudence was one that produced the right results. The

country was at war, fighting dictators who promoted blind worship and trampled on
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human rights of minorities. The Court acted to ensure we did not allow this to happen at

home.

Three major contributions to constitutional law resulted from the free exercise

cases the Jehovah’s Witnesses brought before the Court: the “preferred position” of the
First Amendment freedoms304, incorporating the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment305 and the

application of a strict scrutiny standard to provide maximum protection to free exercise
rights.306In truth, these contributions reflect as well the constitutional faiths of the Justices

who decided these cases, and in so doing transformed the meaning of the free exercise

clause of the First Amendment.
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